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ACORN v. CITY OF PHOENIX: SOLICITING
MOTORISTS IS OFF LIMITS
INTRODUCTION
The first amendment protects the right to freedom of speech.' While the
right to free speech is not absolute, 2 when speech occurs in an area deemed a
traditional public forum,3 the government's ability to restrict it is drastically
limited.4 This is because streets and sidewalks, which are public fora, have
1. The first amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (rejecting argument that first
amendment protection is absolute); M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 52-55 (1984) (rejecting
any form of absolutism in first amendment analysis); Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Man-
datory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 937 (1983)
(rejecting strict absolutist approach). Professor Baker proposes six principles that would provide
more protection to first amendment activity against abridgement than the typical balancing
approach. Id. at 953. Although these principles lean toward an absolutist approach, they consider
the possibility that governmental interests may be more important than first amendment rights in
some instances and, therefore, Baker's principles represent somewhat of a balancing approach.
But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (subscribing to
absolutist approach); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17-20 (1970) (supporting
"full protection" for expression); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 245 (advocating absolutist approach).
3. The Supreme Court has divided the areas in which speech occurs into three fora. See,
e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). These categories
consist of traditional public fora, limited public fora, and nonpublic fora.
Traditional public fora include streets, sidewalks, and parks. In these places, the government
may not prohibit expression. However, regulations on the time, place and manner of communicative
activity will be upheld if these regulations are content-neutral, narrowly drawn to achieve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Limited public fora consist of public places that the state has opened for public communication.
When a state keeps limited public fora open to the public, the same time, place and manner
standards apply as in traditional public fora.
Public places that are not by tradition or designation fora where expressive activity occurs are
deemed nonpublic fora. In such places, a state may restrict speech so that the area may be used
for its intended activity.
This Casenote is only concerned with speech that occurs in traditional public fora.
4. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In Hague, Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality,
stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. Th[is] privilege . . . must
not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
By so stating, Hague has carved out a special place where limitations on speech are at a
minimum.
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been held to be well suited for public speech.' While states may place reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum, these
restrictions must be implemented without regard to the content of the speech.6
The courts will check the government's power to regulate speech by indepen-
dently determining if the regulation is a narrow means of protecting important
interests. 7 Moreover, the courts will not allow the government to place res-
trictions on speech where no alternative channels for communication are
available.
Solicitation of contributions is entitled to first amendment protection since
solicitation possesses various speech characteristics 9 such as communicating
information, disseminating ideas, and advocating causes.10 The time, place and
manner standard, therefore, applies to cases involving solicitation. In ACORN
v. City of Phoenix," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a regulation
5. Id. at 515-16. See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 10-21 (discussing leaflet distribution in public fora). Professor Kalven views
the streets, parks, and similar public places as subject to "a kind of First-Amendment easement."
Id. at 13; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974'Sup. CT. REv. 233 (discussing
access to traditional public fora). For a discussion concerning those characteristics that make
streets, sidewalks, and parks well suited for public expression, see Note, Public Forum Analysis
After Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association - A Conceptual Approach
to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54 FoRDtAM L. REV. 545,
555-62 (1986).
6. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986) (regulation was constitutional
since it was not based on content of movies); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ordinance banning "for sale" signs was struck down because it was based on
content of speech).
7. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (important
interest in maintaining aesthetics of national parks was achieved by narrow regulation that
prohibited camping in Lafayette Park only); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute
prohibiting display of all banners on sidewalk surrounding Supreme Court Building was found
too broad in light of government's interests in maintaining peace and preventing appearance of
outside influence). See generally Note, Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expressive
Activities in the Public Forum, 61 NEaB. L. REv. 167, 177-81 (1982).
8. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (statute
prohibiting posting of signs on lampposts left open adequate alternatives of speaking or distributing
literature); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(statute prohibiting distribution of literature and solicitation on fair grounds left open alternative
of renting booth at the fair where such expressive activity could occur). But see Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (availability of other places in which to express one's views is insufficient
to abridge protected expression).
9. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (solicitation is
form of protected speech); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980) (solicitation is so intertwined with speech that it must be afforded first amendment
protection); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (distributing handbills is not transformed into
unprotected activity by soliciting funds); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (solicitation
may be regulated, but not to extent that it infringes on protected freedoms). See generally T.
EMERSON, supra note 2, at 353 (soliciting funds is expression when essential to communicating
ideas); Steele, Charitable Solicitation, 13 J. LEGIS. 149 (1986) (discussing regulation of solicitation
and protection it should be afforded).
10. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 632.
11. 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986).
1988] ACORN V. CITY OF PHOENIX
that prohibited solicitation from occupants of vehicles in the streets. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the ordinance was a constitutional time, place and
manner regulation. 2 Consequently, solicitation from occupants of vehicles is
totally banned on the streets, 3 an area where the continuous exchange of
ideas occurs most freely.' 4
This Casenote discusses the history of public streets as traditional public
fora and the ability of individuals to exercise their first amendment rights in
such fora, subject only to minimal degrees of regulation in the form of time,
place and manner restrictions. In addition, alternatives to the approach taken
in ACORN will be discussed and the Ninth Circuit's decision in ACORN will
be analyzed.
I. BACKGROUND
Access to streets and parks for the communication of information was
originally recognized in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization."
The ordinance in Hague prohibited distributing literature on the streets or
conducting meetings in public halls without first obtaining a permit from the
chief of police.' 6 Speaking for a plurality of the Court, Justice Roberts
explained that streets have always been used for public speech and should
remain open for such expression. 17 Consequently, this ordinance which granted
city officials the power to deny such access, was incompatible with the first
amendment.' Hague provided the foundation for the development of the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning a speaker's first amendment access
claims to public fora. 9 Traditional public fora are places which, by their very
12. Id. at 1273.
13. This Casenote is concerned specifically with solicitation in the streets. The Phoenix
ordinance prohibits anyone from soliciting people who are in their cars stopped at traffic lights
in the streets. See infra note 73, PHOENIX, ARiz., ORDiNANca §36-101.01 (1984). While this
ordinance may appear to ban only one form of solicitation in the streets, in reality, soliciting
from motorists is the only kind of solicitation that can occur in the streets. Consequently, one
form of speech is completely prohibited in an area where speech is to occur most freely.
14. "A street is continually open, often uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary
conduit in the dally affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the
open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment." Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981). See also Note,
supra note 5, at 555-62 (discussing characteristics that make streets and parks adaptable to public
expression). But see ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d at 1267 (sidewalks are more conducive
to speech than streets that are congested with traffic).
15. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
16. Id. at 501.
17. Id. at 515-16. For the full text of Justice Roberts's often quoted statement, see supra note
4.
18. 307 U.S. at 515-16.
19. Cases decided in the years following Hague consistently struck down statutes restricting
expression in public places. See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (meetings in
public parks); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (meetings in streets); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413 (1943) (distributing handbills in streets and sidewalks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
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nature, are well suited for public assembly and debate. 20 Streets and parks
were thought to be especially well designed for free speech purposes because
such places offer the capacity for large crowds who can receive a speaker's
message at little or no cost.2' This is essential to the public who cannot afford
to finance media exposure.
The Supreme Court recognized a right of access to public places for public
speech purposes. However, many cities continued to enact ordinances to
regulate access to public property in an attempt to keep order and peace and
to minimize community disturbances. 22 This forced the Supreme Court to
define the extent of first amendment protection. The Court provided the
boundaries for first amendment protection by deciding the constitutionality
of ordinances on a case-by-case basis. The Court used a balancing test that
weighed first amendment rights against government interests in establishing
necessary protection in public places. 21 In Schneider v. State,24 the Supreme
Court, confronted with four ordinances that regulated the distribution of
literature in public places, recognized that cities had legitimate interests in
keeping the streets free from congestion. 25 However, the Court balanced these
legitimate government interests against the individuals' interest in speaking
freely. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, found the right to speak freely
fundamental. 26 Building upon the foundation he laid in Hague, Justice Roberts
stated that mere legislative convenience was insufficient to outweigh the im-
portance of first amendment rights that were "vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.' '27 As a result, the Court found that when cities attempt
to regulate, and in the process abridge constitutional rights, such regulations
U.S. 569 (1941) (parading in streets); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distributing literature
in streets).
For an historical overview of the public forum doctrine and first amendment rights, see Werhan,
The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. Rv.
335 (1986).
20. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) ("[A]
principle purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas."); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981) ("A street is . . . a necessary
conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens.").
21. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Martin involved a statute forbidding door-to-
door distribution of literature. The Court recognized that this method of expression was widely
used and necessary for those organizations that could not reach large audiences through more
expensive means. Id. at 146.
22. See supra note 19.
23. See Kalven, supra note 5, at 27-28 (interest in using public fora for speech must be
balanced against interest in using public fora for other reasons).
24. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
25. Id. at 160. Justice Roberts explained, "[A] person could not exercise this liberty [to
distribute literature] by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street contrary to traffic
regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic." Id.
26. Id. at 161.
27. Id.
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cannot stand. 28 Although the cities' asserted interests were valid, the regulations
cannot deny constitutional rights to those who are rightfully upon the streets.29
The Supreme Court, however, found that a statute which restricted speech
only in the context of time, place or manner did not unduly infringe upon
first amendment freedoms.30 Time, place and manner regulations originated
in Lovell v. Griffin.31 In Lovell, an ordinance prohibited the distribution of
literature within the city without first obtaining a permit from a city official.32
Alma Lovell was convicted for violating this ordinance when she distributed
Jehovah's Witness pamphlets. In reversing Lovell's conviction, the Supreme
Court held that the ordinance did not limit the time, place or manner of her
speech.33 Rather, the ordinance was a complete ban on the distribution of
literature. The city argued that its interests in maintaining sanitation and public
order were the basis for this ordinance.14 Although the Court in Lovell
recognized that these were valid concerns, it found that the ordinance did not
restrict the time, place or manner of the speech in such a way as to achieve
the stated city interests. The Court found that the ordinance, in one broad
sweep, tried to regulate the distribution of literature and if upheld, would
have had the effect of subjecting all speech to censorship. 5 The Court explained
that the first amendment was adopted to prevent the existence of such a broad
restraint.3 6 Consequently, the Court held the ordinance void.37
While Lovell was a first amendment challenge based on freedom of the
press and the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court also has applied
the time, place and manner standard to free speech challenges concerning
public fora.38 Solicitation is encompassed in first amendment free speech rights.
28. Id. at 160. Cities "may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare
or convenience, [but] these may not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution
to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or opinion." Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (statute prohibiting loud and raucous
noises on streets upheld as reasonable time, place and manner regulation); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941) (statute forbidding street parades without a license upheld as reasonable time,
place and manner regulation).
31. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
32. Id. at 447. The Lovell ordinance prohibited the distribution of "circulars, handbooks,
advertising, or literature of any kind" within the city "without first obtaining written permission
from the City Manager." Id.
33. Id. at 451. The Lovell Court stated with respect to the ordinance: "It is not limited to
ways which might be regarded as inconsistent with the maintenance of public order, or as involving
disorderly conduct .... The ordinance prohibits the distribution of literature of any kind at any
time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit from the City Manager." Id.
34. Id. at 445.
35. Id. at 451.
36. Id. at 451-52.
37. Id. at 452.
38. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Cox was a free speech challenge to a
state law prohibiting a "parade or procession" upon a public street without a special license
obtained from a licensing authority. Several Jehovah's Witnesses violated this law and the Court
19881
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Solicitation, as a form of expression, conveys an idea and asks for money in
exchange. The speech component, however, does not lose its protection because
it is accompanied by a request for monetary contributions.39 When the main
purpose behind the speech is to propose a commercial transaction, and thus
gain through private profit, the speech is considered commercial and will not
receive the same heightened level of protection as non-commercial speech 0
However, solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations does not
fall into the commercial speech category.4'
Solicitation involves many of the speech characteristics that justify protec-
tion, including communicating ideas, disseminating information, and advo-
cating causes. 42 Thus, many solicitation statutes have been struck down using
the time, place and manner standard. One of the earliest cases to address the
issue of permissible restrictions on charitable solicitation was Cantwell v.
Connecticut.43 In Cantwell, several Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for
violating a statute that prohibited soliciting money for religious or charitable
causes. 4 Cantwell challenged the ordinance on free speech and free exercise
grounds. The Court acknowledged that the state may regulate the time, place
or manner of solicitation on the streets as long as it is done in a nondiscrim-
inatory manner. 45 However, in Cantwell, the statute did not even attempt to
regulate time, place or manner, but instead, totally prohibited solicitation
without a permit 6 Although a state's interest in protecting its citizens from
fraud disguised as religion was found valid, this interest was not achieved by
the statute's blanket prohibition. 4' To be valid, the statute must be drawn
narrowly with respect to the time, place or manner of the solicifation in light
of the city's asserted interest. 48 The regulation in Cantwell failed because it
was not drawn narrowly enough to restrict only the conduct that presented a
upheld their convictions. The Court relied on the state supreme court's interpretation of the law
which provided that the licensing authority could consider only the time, place and manner of
the speech in issuing licenses. This was an objective standard and did not give the local authority
unfettered discretion. It also prevented confusion and chaos that might occur if two parades
wanted to use the streets at the same time.
39. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976).
40. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (establishing
test that applies to commercial speech cases).
41. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). Accord
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (conceding that solicitation is not deserving of
less protection, but finding that expression takes on commercial aspect when selling is involved).
42. See supra note 9.
43. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
44. Id. at 301-02. The statute provided: "No person shall solicit money, services . . . or any
valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a
member of the organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting. ... Id.
45. Id. at 304.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 304-05.
48. Id. at 311.
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conflict with the city's asserted interests. 49 The Supreme Court continues to
use the time, place and manner test when balancing an individual's interest in
free speech against a government's interest in maintaining an orderly and safe
community. 0 The time, place and manner test remains the proper standard
in first amendment cases, and therefore, in the solicitation area. Thus, the
Court will uphold a regulation on speech in the public fora if the regulation
is content-neutral, if it is drawn narrowly to achieve a significant government
interest, and if there are ample alternative channels of communication left
open. " When all three requirements are met, the statute is a proper time,
place and manner regulation of the speech.
The first prong of the time, place and manner test requires the regulation
to be content-neutral . 2 Early speech regulations vested authority in a city
official to permit or deny speech to occur.5 3 Courts soon found that such a
scheme allowed a city official to base his choice on whether or not he approved
of a speaker's views.14 Thus, speakers were being regulated according to the
content of their speech. Although other statutes did not place the authority
to allow or disallow speech in the hands of a city official," the language of
the statutes denied individuals the right to speak based solely on the content
of the speech. The Supreme Court recognizes that when speech is banned
because of its content, the states are not concerned with the safety or order
of the community. 6 States can only regulate speech when it conflicts with a
significant government interest, not because of its message or subject matter.57
Therefore, if a time, place and manner regulation is to be held valid, then it
must be content-neutral. 8
49. Id.
50. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (interest in
free speech outweighed interest in protecting neighborhood from fraud); Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (same); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (same).
51. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (test
used to uphold regulation on camping in public parks; camping in this context was intended as
expressive activity); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (ordinance prohibiting display
of signs on sidewalk across from Supreme Court Building was struck down using test).
52. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981). See generally Baker, supra note 2, at 958-59 ("[T]he
government can discriminate neither among nor against first amendment expression."); Redish,
The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. RaV. 113 (1981).
53. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 558-59 n.1 (1948) (statute prohibited public speech
through loudspeakers in public places in the absence of permission from chief of police).
54. Id. at 560-61. The chief of police had uncontrolled discretion to arbitrarily suppress the
expression. Id.
55. See Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-93 (1972) (statute prohibited all
picketing except peaceful labor picketing near school building while school was in session).
56. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980); Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
57. The Supreme Court stated that "above all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content." Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
58. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212.
19881
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The second prong of the test is whether or not the regulation is drawn
narrowly to achieve a significant government interest.5 9 The Supreme Court
has held some government interests significant. These include controlling
traffic, 60 preventing crime and fraud,6 1 and avoiding traffic distractions. 62
Although such concerns may be valid government interests, a regulation must
precisely control the problems it is designed to protect. 6 Moreover, a regulation
must be the least restrictive means available. 64 When a statute is designed to
completely prohibit speech instead of only regulating it, less restrictive alter-
natives generally exist. 6 Therefore, such a statute will probably fail this part
of the test.
However, even if a statute satisfies the first two prongs of the test, it must
still leave ample alternative channels of communication open.66 While there
may always be another way to get a speaker's message out to an audience,
these alternatives must be adequate ways of communicating. 67 Furthermore,
the existence of alternative channels in which to communicate alone is not
enough to justify regulating speech that occurs in a public forum.6 A statute
59. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45;
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648.
60. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650 (ordinance restricting distribution and solicitation on fair-
grounds upheld in interest of controlling orderly movement of fair-goers); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (ordinance requiring parade or procession license was upheld in interest
of traffic control).
61. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976) (interest in protecting citizens
against crime valid, but statute not sufficiently narrow); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(although asserted interest in preventing fraud was valid, ordinance banning door-to-door solici-
tation was invalidated).
62. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (interest in avoiding traffic distractions
sufficient to uphold ban on use of amplification devices in public places); Erznoznik, 422 U.S.
at 214-15 (asserted interest in preventing traffic distractions was significant, but Court found that
it was not served by the ordinance).
63. See Steele, supra note 9, at 167 (time, place and manner standard requires narrowly drawn
regulations to combat problems presented).
64. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (less
restrictive means for maintaining aesthetics of park were not available); Village of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) (methods less restrictive than total
prohibition were available); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (less intrusive methods
of regulation were available).
65. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 637.
66. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45;
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648. See generally M. REDISH, supra note 2, at 88-89. Professor Redish
suggests that the opposite of a time, place and manner regulation is an absolute prohibition on
expression because no alternatives are available when speech is absolutely prohibited. Id.
67. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) ("[A]
restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are
inadequate."). See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981) (statute
struck down when adequate alternatives unavailable); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (statute struck down because available alternatives unsatis-
factory).
68. See generally Baker, supra note 2, at 967-69 (to satisfy time, place and manner standard
alternative channels must be available, but this alone is insufficient).
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regulating speech in a public forum, therefore, will be upheld only if it satisfies
all three parts of the time, place and manner test.
II. THE ACORN DECISION
Against this background, the Ninth Circuit, in ACORN v. City of Phoenix,69
considered whether an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of funds from
occupants of vehicles stopped at intersections was a valid time, place and
manner regulation. The Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN) is a nonprofit political action organization working to promote
the concerns of low and moderate income citizens. 70 ACORN members generate
funds through the practice of "tagging." 7' "Tagging" requires a member to
step into the street and approach an automobile that is stopped at a traffic
light. The member provides the occupant of the car with a piece of paper or
"tag" which explains ACORN's organization and activities in return for a
contribution from the motorist.72
A local chapter of the ACORN organization engaged in the "tagging"
procedure on the streets of Phoenix, Arizona. However, a Phoenix ordinance
prohibited anyone from standing in the street and soliciting contributions from
occupants of vehicles.73 Phoenix police officers informed ACORN that its
conduct was illegal and any members that continued this conduct would be
subject to citation.7 4 ACORN and its members filed suit against the City of
Phoenix, claiming that the ordinance was unconstitutional. 75 ACORN alleged
that the ordinance violated the first and fourteenth amendments of the Con-
stitution by infringing upon its members' protected right of free speech.7 6 The
city argued that the ordinance was necessary to maintain public safety and to
minimize disruptions in the flow of traffic.77
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the
ordinance as constitutional on the grounds that streets were not public fora
designated for the exercise of free speech and that the ordinance was a
reasonable, content-neutral regulation to promote public peace, health, and
safety. The district court recognized that the Supreme Court held that streets
were public fora, but thought that this did not include intersections. 79 As a
69. 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986).
70. Id. at 1262.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1262. PHOENIX, ARz., ORDINANCE §36-101.01 (1984). The ordinance provides: No
person shall stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business,
or contributions from the occupants of any vehicle.
74. 798 F.2d at 1262.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1268.
78. ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ariz. 1985).
79. Id. at 870-71.
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result of finding no public forum, the district court held that the only
considerations were whether the statute was content-neutral and reasonable.80
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the ordinance
was a reasonable time, place and manner regulation."s The appellate court
declined to decide if the streets, while being used by motor vehicles, remain
perpetual traditional public fora. s2 The court assumed for the purpose of
deciding this case that such streets were public fora. s3 As a result, the standard
used was whether the regulation was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and left open ample alternative channels
of communication.84
The court found that the ordinance was content-neutral.15 The regulation
applied to every individual or organization without regard to the content of
the speech. The ordinance flatly banned all solicitation on the streets from
occupants of vehicles, regardless of the speech involved or the people attempt-
ing to solicit. Therefore, the regulation was not content-based. 86
Next, the Ninth Circuit considered the validity of the city's interests and
whether the regulation was narrowly drawn to achieve those interests. The
first interest the city asserted was in the substantial risk of disruption to the
orderly flow of traffic.8 7 The court stated that a similar interest was recognized
by the Supreme Court in the setting of a state fair in Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc."s This interest is a valid concern in
crowded urban areas because one disruption in the flow of traffic can cause
backups and delays which extend down the roadway. 89 Solicitation is more
apt to cause such disruptions because it requires an involved response from
the audience.9 The receiver must offer money in exchange for the information
distributed. 9' The ACORN court found the ordinance was aimed narrowly at
this specific disruptive conduct because it banned only solicitation of vehicle
occupants. 92 Moreover, the ordinance only prohibited vehicle solicitation and
not other forms of communication such as dispensing literature to occupants
80. Id. at 871.
81. ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 1267.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
85. Id.
86. Id. The parties stipulated in a pretrial order that the ordinance was adopted to promote
the city's interests in public peace, health, and safety and not to suppress the views of those
wishing to solicit in the streets. Id. at 1267-68. Therefore, any arguments that the ordinance was
content-based would not stand. Id.
87. Id. at 1268.
88. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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of vehicles. 93 The ordinance, therefore, was narrowly tailored to serve the
interest in avoiding disruption to traffic.94
The second interest to which the test was applied was the city's concern for
traffic and public safety. 95 In addressing this issue, the ACORN court relied
on a Seventh Circuit case that upheld a similar ordinance. The Ninth Circuit
found that the Phoenix regulation "appears to be a narrowly drawn regulation
to address these safety concerns. ' 97 ACORN argued that there were several
locations where solicitation from motorists would not present traffic hazards.9
In addition, ACORN presented safety conditions which they contended, if
followed, would minimize safety problems. 99 These arguments, however, were
rejected. The court found that the mere presence of solicitors in the streets
presented potential safety hazards. 1°° In addition, the court stated that the
"multiplied effect" of other organizations wanting to engage in this solicitation
activity and the potential safety problems of such a situation could be consid-
ered in determining the validity of the ordinance. 1 1 Thus, it was found that
"widespread disorder" and disruption would be the result of such activity. 10 2
The appellate court also rejected ACORN's argument that the city could
achieve these interests through a less restrictive ordinance that only prohibits
solicitation which disrupts traffic or presents safety hazards.103 Relying on the
district court's factual finding that the mere presence of solicitors in the streets
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1269.
96. United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1980). Oremus involved the
validity of a state statute that prohibited standing on a highway to solicit contributions from the
occupants of vehicles. The Oremus court found the statute was narrowly drawn because it "only
modestly restricts solicitation by prohibiting it only on highways." Id. at 688. The ACORN statute
is much broader than the one at issue in Oremus because it prohibited soliciting in all streets as
well as highways.
97. 798 F.2d at 1269 (footnote omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1270 n.10. ACORN's expert witness suggested a list of conditions to minimize
traffic hazards:
(1) require solicitors to wear high visibility clothing; (2) impose a limit on the number
of solicitors working at an intersection; (3) limit solicitation to 'the left side of one-
way streets, where there is no curbed parking' and 'on the median side of streets that
have barrier type medians, with raised curbing on the approach to signal lighted
intersections' where the median is at least six-feet wide; (4) require solicitors to return
to a neutral area when the traffic signal changes to yellow for cross traffic; (5) require
soliciting organizations to post a supervisor with a whistle at each intersection to
monitor the traffic light; (6) limit solicitation to daylight hours; and (7) prohibit
solicitors from going into the street between cars that are backed up.
Id. The court stated that even if such conditions were complied with, the mere presence of people
on the streets presented traffic hazards. Id.
100. Id. (citing the district court opinion, 603 F. Supp. at 871).
101. 798 F.2d at 1270 (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 652-54 (1981))..
102. Id. (quoting Heffron, 452 U.S. at 653).
103. 798 F.2d at 1270.
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presented potential safety hazards, the regulation was upheld as narrowly
drawn to achieve the city's interests in traffic and public safety.1 °4
Finally, the court addressed the third prong of the test.105 This last prong
requires that ample alternative channels of communication be left open when
a public forum is involved. 1°6 ACORN argued that soliciting motorists is an
especially effective way of fundraising for which no alternative method of
communication existed. 07 However, the court found that ACORN had access
to other modes of fundraising. 08 The Ninth Circuit proposed alternative
methods of solicitation and did not agree that ACORN was left with no
alternative approach because this "one questionable approach to soliciting
contributions" 09 was prohibited.
Consequently, the ACORN court found that the ordinance was a reasonable
time, place and manner regulation. 0 The regulation was content-neutral and
furthered important city interests in safety and the orderly flow of traffic. In
addition, ample alternative methods of communicating with others were avail-
able to the members of ACORN."'
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit correctly followed the Supreme Court's method of ap-
plying the time, place and manner test which balances the competing interests
in the context of a first amendment claim. However, the weight given to the
individuals' free speech rights by the ACORN court fell far short of what is
required. The Supreme Court has continually permitted expressive activity to
occur in traditional public fora, subject only to narrow regulations that are
necessary to achieve significant government concerns." 2 The ACORN court
failed to fully scrutinize the ordinance at issue under the applicable time, place
and manner test.
The ACORN court properly concluded that the ordinance was content-
neutral because it restricted solicitation in an even-handed manner.' It does
not automatically follow, however, that the ordinance is constitutional. Even
content-neutral statutes are capable of unconstitutionally restricting protected
expression." 4 The level of scrutiny, therefore, should not be decreased after a
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1271.
106. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
107. 798 F.2d at 1271.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1273.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
113. 798 F.2d at 1267-68.
114. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-83 (1983) (ordinance found content-neutral,
but unconstitutional since it did not narrowly fit government interest); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (Court held state's interest in preventing litter was insufficient to justify
ordinance, even though it was content-neutral).
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finding of content-neutrality. The ACORN court, however, assumed that the
balance struck by the Phoenix City Council was deserving of deference since
the ordinance did not appear to be based on the content of the speech. This
is evident from the lack of analysis in which the Ninth Circuit engaged when
considering the fit of the ordinance to the achievement of the city's interests.
Unfortunately, the court did not continue to analyze the ordinance so that
first amendment rights would be preserved.
The ACORN court relied on Heffron"'5 for the proposition that solicitation
presents a "substantial risk of disruption in crowd or traffic control.""16 It is
true that the Heffron Court prohibited solicitors from walking among the
fair-goers and soliciting contributions because of concerns for safety and traffic
flow. These concerns were held to be significant enough to restrict the free
speech activities." 7 However, unlike the ordinance in ACORN, the regulation
in Heffron did not totally ban solicitors from the forum."'8 The Heffron
regulation only restricted the place within the forum where the solicitors could
not go. In upholding the regulation, the Heffron Court found it significant
that the solicitors were not completely denied access to the public forum.'
Since it was only a certain area within the forum which was off limits, the
solicitors were still able to exercise their rights in this forum, but in a regulated
manner. The obvious distinction between the Heffron regulation and the
ACORN ordinance is that the latter prohibited free speech activity while the
former merely regulated it. Thus, an ordinance attempting to merely regulate,
and not prohibit solicitation within the forum, would not improperly infringe
on constitutional rights and would be a valid time, place and manner regu-
lation. Improperly, however, the Ninth Circuit relied solely on Heffron to
reach its conclusion that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve the
city's interest and it thus met the second prong of the test. While this may
have been a convenient way to satisfy the second prong, it is not sufficient
to justify a prohibition on first amendment activity in a public forum. 20 In
addition, the Heffron Court found any analogies between fairgrounds and
public streets to be imprecise because safety and crowd control are more
compelling in the context of a fairground than in the streets.' 2' A further
115. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
116. 798 F.2d at 1268.
117. 452 U.S. at 655 n.16. Those wishing to distribute and solicit were not prohibited from
doing so everywhere in the fair. They had the opportunity to engage in the first amendment
activity from booths set up on the fairgrounds. Id.
118. Id. at 655. In addition, the forum involved in Heffron was only a limited public forum.
In such fora, the government's ability to restrict speech and related activity is not as limited as
in traditional public fora. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983). A state is not required to keep open limited public fora, and thus, may even-handedly
deny access to such places, unlike traditional public fora. Id. at 46.
119. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655.
120. Governmental convenience is insufficient to justify a restriction on free speech in public
fora. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
121. 452 U.S. at 651. The Supreme Court noted that fairgrounds are more compact and the
ability to move around freely is not as great as when streets are involved.
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distinction between Heffron and ACORN is the forum involved in each.
Heffron dealt with a fairground which was found to be a limited public
forum. 22 Consequently, the level of protection afforded the speech was lower.'23
The ACORN court, therefore, should have afforded the speech that occurred
in the street, a less regulatable forum, more protection than was given in
Heffron.
Not only did the statute in Heffron regulate solicitation, it also restricted
the distribution of literature.'2 Handbillers were required to remain in the
prescribed booths and not wander among the people at the fair. It can be
inferred from Heffron that solicitation presents no more potential for con-
gestion than does distribution of literature.' 25 However, the court in ACORN
held that the ordinance, which completely banned vehicle solicitation, would
alleviate the possible disruption of traffic flow, but continued to allow indi-
viduals to distribute literature to occupants of vehicles.'26 Such a holding is
inconsistent. The Ninth Circuit hoped to avoid the disruptions in traffic flow
by completely prohibiting one form of expression on the streets, regardless of
the safety measures that might be taken while engaging in the expression. A
much more narrowly focused and less restrictive solution would be to regulate
the solicitation of vehicle occupants that presents traffic hazards 27 instead of
upholding a blanket prohibition of one form of speech.' 28 The ACORN court,
however, improperly found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to achieve
the government interests in preventing disruptions in the orderly flow of traffic
and in maintaining traffic safety.
The Ninth Circuit was correct in recognizing that alternative channels for
communication must remain open in order for the ordinance to be a valid
time, place and manner regulation.'2 9 However, the ACORN court failed to
analyze the adequacy of the alternatives. The court merely stated that there
were other ways for ACORN to convey its message. 30 How well these alter-
122. 452 U.S. at 655.
123. See supra note 118.
124. 452 U.S. at 643-44.
125. Contra 452 U.S. at 665 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (solicitation
presents greater problems with crowd control than does distribution).
126. ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1268. "Direct communication of ideas, including the distribution
of literature to occupants of vehicles, is not restricted." Id.
127. The right to engage in expressive activities rests on the principle that "one who is rightfully
on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the
constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion." Jamison v. Texas; 318 U.S. 413,
416 (1943).
128. Several locations where solicitation would not present traffic hazards were advanced by
ACORN. In addition, the organization offered safety conditions that would protect against traffic
disruption and hazards. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
130. 798 F.2d at 1271. The court stated that ample alternatives such as "solicitation on the
sidewalk from pedestrians, canvassing door-to-door, telephone campaigns, or direct mail" were
available to ACORN. Id. However, ACORN argued that soliciting the occupants of vehicles was
much more effective than any other method of communication. Id.
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natives served the purpose for which ACORN engaged in this speech was not
considered. Although the trend by the Supreme Court has been to find
alternatives readily available,"' the adequacy of such alternatives should still
be reviewed or this part of the test will become meaningless.
In addition, the ACORN court was unwilling to consider seriously the
solicitation claim as one that falls within first amendment protection. The
reference made to this one form of solicitation as a "questionable approach"1 3 2
to expressive activity, reflects a lack of willingness to accept solicitation's
constitutional nature. However, the fact that an exchange of money accom-
panies the distribution of a message does not take this mode of expression
out of first amendment protection. The main purpose of charitable solicitation
is to inform society about issues of public interest and seek support for these
important concerns. Unlike those who engage in commercial speech, which
proposes a commercial transaction, charitable solicitors are not concerned with
private profit. "' The first amendment was not adopted to further the profit-
makers of society, but to protect and encourage those who take a minority
view to speak out and share their ideas. Solicitation, therefore, as a form of
speech, is fully entitled to constitutional protection. 3 4 The Supreme Court
explicitly stated in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't 133 that
solicitation shares many of the same characteristics as pure speech.'36 Thus,
solicitation should be afforded the same degree of protection as speech that
is not accompanied by an exchange of money. The Ninth Circuit should have
readily recognized such a well-established principle. Yet it is not clear that the
court accepted this proposition in its analysis.
131. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). Although
the alternatives that were open to the taxpayers were not as convenient or inexpensive as posting
signs on street poles, the Vincent Court noted that adequate alternatives were available. Id. at
812. But see City of, Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986),
aff'd mem., 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987). Watseka involved a statute prohibiting solicitation before 9
a.m. and after 5 p.m. The city of Watseka argued that alternative means, such as soliciting during
the day, by mail, or over the phone, were available. However, the Watseka court accepted IPAC's
unrebuttable argument that these alternatives were "more expensive and less effective than in-
person solicitation." 796 F.2d at 1558. As a result, the court found insufficient alternatives
available. In doing so, the court looked at the adequacy of the alternatives, not merely the
existence of alternatives. Id.
132. 798 F.2d at 1271.
133. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court
stated with regard to those engaging in charitable solicitation:
Canvassers in such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money. Further-
more, because charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic decisions
and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the characteristics
and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as a variety
of purely commercial speech.
Id. at 632 (footnote omitted).
134. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
135. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
136. Id. at 632.
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The Ninth Circuit also was hesitant to accept the long established consti-
tutional principle that public streets fall into the category of public fora.
Consequently, only an assumption was made that streets are traditional public
fora.117 Streets have long been considered traditional public fora.3 8 Such fora
may be subject to some regulations, but these regulations cannot unduly
infringe upon first amendment rights.3 9 As a result of this assumption, the
ACORN court avoided close examination of ACORN's claim. A court must
engage in a thorough analysis, based upon the nature of the forum, to
determine if first amendment rights are being unconstitutionally denied.'14
Since the decision was not based on a specific finding but only on a mere
assumption that a public forum was involved, the ACORN court glossed over
the analysis of whether or not the ordinance was narrowly drawn to effectuate
the concerns advanced by the city. If the ACORN court had correctly rec-
ognized that streets fit into the category of traditional public fora, then the
proper analysis might have been undertaken in its decision. A court must
undertake a thorough analysis of the fit between the government interests and
the manner in which the ordinance regulates this interest when a public forum
is involved.'41 However, the Ninth Circuit simply accepted the city's interests
as sufficient to deny ACORN members the ability to exercise their rights in
a public forum, without explaining why the scale tipped in favor of the city.' 42
IV. IMPACT
The time, place and manner standard has stood for the proposition that,
sometimes, speech protected by the first amendment must be regulated in
public places because government interests are more important. In formulating
the requirements that make up the time, place and manner standard, the
Supreme Court retained as much protection as possible for free speech, while
allowing the government to regulate speech activity in the interest of valid
community concerns. When deciding if the speech should be suppressed in
various situations, courts must engage in a balancing test to determine whether
the government regulated the speech in a valid manner. Only speech that
conflicts with a valid government interest may be regulated by a restriction
on the time, the place or the manner of the activity. When a statute completely
prohibits one form of speech, it is not a proper regulation of the time, place
or manner of the expression. An absolute ban does not narrowly suppress
speech that is in conflict with the government interest.
137. 798 F.2d at 1267.
138. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
140. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Cornelius did
not involve a traditional public forum, but the Court noted that the appropriate analysis depends
on the nature of the forum involved. Id. at 797.
141. Id.
142. 798 F.2d at 1268-69.
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The Ninth Circuit in ACORN distinguished between solicitation and other
forms of speech such as oral advocacy and distribution of literature. In doing
so, the court decreased the amount of protection previously afforded solici-
tation. Even if those wishing to engage in solicitation on the streets took all
possible precautionary measures, ACORN denies them access to the streets.
Following ACORN, the focus is not on the adverse effect of the expression
in the community; it is instead strictly on the label given to the expression. A
court following the holding in ACORN, therefore, is not required to grant
solicitation the same degree of protection as other forms of speech. Moreover,
the lower courts will find no guidance in ACORN for analyzing an ordinance
under the time, place and manner test. The Ninth Circuit's decision lacks the
appropriate analysis and upholds a ban against constitutionally protected
speech.
In addition, the relevance of the speech occurring in a traditional public
forum falls by the wayside. Streets previously were characterized as places
well designed for the free exchange of ideas. This is no longer true if those
ideas are accompanied by an exchange of money. Suddenly, the streets become
ill-equipped to handle such activity. Those seeking to express themselves are
no longer assured a place on the streets to do so. Streets originally were
characterized as traditional public fora because they are open and provide
space to reach many people. 43 These factors now are irrelevant when solici-
tation is involved.
As an alternative to upholding the complete prohibition of solicitation from
occupants of vehicles, the ACORN court should have found that the ordinance
was not drawn narrowly enough to achieve the significant city interests.
Concerns for traffic safety and control are important. However, by prohibiting
such solicitation only during times when many cars are on the streets and by
requiring strict compliance with safety regulations, the court could protect
government interests and still allow ACORN and other groups to exercise
their first amendment rights. As a result of upholding this ordinance, it is
extremely unlikely that local legislatures will attempt to draft ordinances that
are narrowly tailored to restrict only the speech that conflicts with the concerns
of the city. In light of the ACORN decision, a complete prohibition on
solicitation from occupants of vehicles is sufficiently narrow and will be upheld
by courts following ACORN. As a result, an individual's free speech rights
are curtailed. Those who desire to express themselves through solicitation on
the streets will be relegated to places that are not as compatible with these
first amendment activities.
Since the ACORN decision, however, the Supreme Court has upheld the
Seventh Circuit opinion of City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council. "
This decision found an ordinance that restricted the time when door-to-door
143. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
144. 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986), aff'd mem., 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987).
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solicitation could occur unconstitutional. 145 The time, place and manner test
was applied to the Watseka ordinance. 146 The ordinance failed to meet the
second and third prongs of the test. The Seventh Circuit found that the
ordinance was not tailored narrowly to achieve the city's interests in preventing
crime and protecting citizens' privacy.' 47 The city of Watseka wanted to
prohibit all door-to-door solicitation during the hours of 5 p.m. and 9 a.m.,
not just that solicitation which presented problems of crime and invasion of
privacy.'4 8 In addition, the ordinance did not leave open any adequate alter-
native channels of communication. The court found that the alternative solic-
itation measures proposed by the city 49 were more expensive and not as
effective as door-to-door solicitation.'50 By affirming the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Watseka, the Supreme Court sent a message that regulations which
infringe on first amendment rights, and more specifically the right to express
oneself through solicitation, will not be upheld in the future. Moreover,
solicitation is still entitled to full first amendment protection.'
V. CONCLUSION
The ACORN court's analysis ignores the rationale behind the need to
regulate narrowly only speech that conflicts with significant government in-
terests. In our society the free exchange of ideas is encouraged. Without
narrowly tailored statutes, it is possible and probable that a great deal of
protected speech will be prohibited. Consequently, if the right to speak freely
is increasingly restricted, the strength behind the first amendment will soon
disappear.
Marcy K. Weaver
145. Id. The ordinance made it unlawful to solicit "prior to 9:00 o'clock A.M. or after 5:00
o'clock P.M. of any weekday, or at anytime on a Sunday or on a state or national holiday."
WATSEKA, ILL., REV. ORDtnaNA¢ ch. 19, §19-9 (1979).
146. 796 F.2d at 1552.
147. Id. at 1555-56.
148. Id. The city of Watseka was concerned with crime that accompanies door-to-door solici-
tation. The majority of Watseka's evidence on this issue focused on criminal acts that happen
when it is dark outside. Id. The court recognized Watseka's interests, but stated that if the city
was indeed concerned with preventing crime, then the hours during which solicitation should be
banned are those hours when it is dark and not simply from 5 p.m. to 9 a.m. Id.
149. Id. at 1557. The city of Watseka argued that the Illinois Public Action Council still had
the option to "canvass in public places, canvass during the daytime (9 a.m. to 5 p.m.), and
canvass by mail or over the phone." Id.
150. Id. at 1558.
151. Id.
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